Member States of the European Union, in particular those making part of the Eurozone, may discover, in times of great crisis, the limits of their federative pact, not only as imposed on them by virtue of the Union’s structure but also as set by the substance of norms of conduct in matters of high policy, crucial issues for the national population in terms of creation of wealth and allocation of resources. Barely referred to in the treaties of the Union, such norms give rise to fierce political fighting, often in a way not profitable to all actors, especially in cases where a strong majority of States seeks to impose uniform stances on diverging partners. Democracy is of no assistance to the latter, whether in the form of national parliamentary majorities or in terms of equality of arguments, before a parrhesiastic discourse by the deviating partner. The case of Greece illustrates well this issue.
EU, Greece, democracy, debt, transnational governance, neo-liberalism