Culture as a key factor within Western societies and a political tool for the European Union

Abstract

What could be more antithetical than the alliance of the words “culture” and “political power”? Yet, for over fifty years, the process of European integration has been linking these opposing concepts: Europe, which is too often considered in economic terms, is first and foremost a cultural entity. European culture, ‘a sort of UFO’¹ for most Europeans has become a major political and philosophical issue. Given their political and strategic importance so-called ‘geo-cultural’ issues have been called upon to constitute, along with geopolitical and economic issues, a governance axis. The European Union’s current mode of cultural action, intrinsic to national policies, is unable to address these issues. Indeed the EU should completely rethink its conception and political implication of culture, and recognize its great importance, both for the success of European integration, and for the new civic relationships which are developing today in our local, national and global communities.

Key Words

European culture, culture and politics, european union, european citizenship.

Introduction

Europe, which is too often considered along market principles, is first and foremost a cultural reality. This affirmation, evident to all non-Europeans, is nevertheless difficult to conjure up at the very heart of the European Union itself (EU). It is also important to remember the fact that over the centuries the word culture has been invested with multiple meanings evolving with history and social changes, to the point of encompassing everything and meaning nothing.

The aim of this paper is to define what the EU presently understands as constituting culture and the place it is given in the Union’s political construction. Rather than establishing a definition of culture the objective here is to paint a picture that reflects the Union’s conception of culture through its legal basis and policies, especially through its external action.

If we are to consider, in parallel, the evolution of culture and that of the European Union, we realize that the former was understood as much in terms of artistic production and external practices as it was as a set of ways of thinking, sentiments, perceptions and ways of being –all deeply internalized creators of identity.

Historical and Juridical background

If we think of the EU’s emphasis on culture, from a historical and legal point of view, we will notice that its political ‘taking into account’ and its institutionalization within the EU, started only in 1993, when the Treaty on European Union² entered into force. Aimed at ‘encouraging’, ‘supporting’ and ‘supplementing’ the actions of the Member States, “while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”, the article 151 (which is now 167 in the Lisbon Treaty) gave some competence to the EU, but only in a ‘complementary’ form which meant that any act of harmonization of legal and regulatory provisions of the Member States was excluded from the scope of the article. This provision is still valid today.

The Lisbon Treaty changes only a few things. In addition to this specific article, some other cultural references appear:

1. a new point added to the Preamble, specifies that the Treaty draws: “inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”.
2. the third article of the Treaty, at the third paragraph, now states that the European Union “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced”.
3. In the section named “Categories and areas of the Union’s competence”, article 6, the Treaty lists various actions that the EU can take “to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States”. Here the Treaty reiterates that culture is one of these areas.
4. Finally, article 300, paragraph 2 on the Economic and Social Committee states that: “The Committee shall consist of representatives of organizations of employers, of the employed, and of other parties representative of civil society, notably in socio-economic, civic, professional and cultural areas”. This is the first reference to cultural organizations as members of civil society.

Thus, the only important change is in the procedure itself: the decision-making in the Council will now be treated under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) as opposed to the current unanimous vote. Until December 2009 and its entry into force, all cultural measures were agreed by a co-decision procedure shared by the European Parliament and the Council, with decisions in the Council having to be taken unanimously. “The key impact of this could be a progressive weakening of national veto in cultural affairs, a very sensitive point. However, as there is still no possibility of harmonization of regulation in the cultural policy area, the QMV rule will apply principally to decisions concerning the format and scope of the funding programs.”³ So, it would undoubtedly make it easier to increase the size of cultural budget in the future. But, nevertheless, the primacy of national policy remains as a corner stone of cultural action in Europe.

To summarize, from the creation of the European Communities until Maastricht, there was no cultural policy neither even interest in cultural matters. And if we consider the role given to culture in the Treaties, since 1992 until the Lisbon Treaty in order to determine, through the analysis of their evolutions and regressions, we notice a quasistatus quo.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, brought about a radical change in the approach to culture. The apparition of a number of new independent states and the cultural justification for their independence on the international arena became a major political issue, placing culture in the heart of the debate. “The concept of culture was expanded to encompass that of ‘identity’ itself”⁴. Subsequently the notion of culture, attached to the idea of endogenous development, acquired new political substance. The link between culture and development contributed to arguments in favor of financial and administrative aid to developing countries who claimed their right to define their ‘own’ ways of development in order to fully and equally participate in international affairs. Once again the question of identity and European heritage came to the fore in countries that were for the most part, previously colonized by Europe. Lastly, the successive conflicts, notably in former Yugoslavia, crystallized the link between culture and democracy. They “questioned” culture on the rights of the minorities or the coexistence of culturally diverse communities.

More recently, social tensions that have become stronger not only on the international but also on the national, regional and local scale, particularly in urban settings, highlight further « the need for tolerance not only between societies, but within them as well»⁵, raising anew not only questions regarding the role of culture, but also the link between culture and democracy and criteria inherent to these societies’ identity and self-perception.

In light of these considerations, both historical and geopolitical, this study will aim to address this new identityorientated understanding of culture. Little by little culture has acquired identity connotations that have been growing stronger and stronger to the point of identity being assimilated into culture. Apart from being extremely reductionist such a ‘definition’ could end up being “anti-cultural” ridding Europe of its long tradition of integration and diversity, in the name of safeguarding particularities.

Culture, National identity and society

The cultural and identity questions continue to be of crucial importance to social reflection, not only in the EU. The confrontation with “the other” over the past forty years has highlighted the cultural dimensions of our societies and has given rise to numerous questions: is identity a factor that explains integration in other political domains, as it is currently the case? Will it be in the future the driving factor in the creation of a common cultural policy within the EU or an additional obstacle? These are the questions that were being asked within the EU and are still being raised today to the point of finding themselves in the heart of the enlargement policy.

As the Eurobarometer (Flash 257) shows, citizens considered freedom and democratic values as the most essential factor at the EU and the personal level. The third most important issue was immigration (this was given more importance as a national issue than at the EU and personal levels), and this was followed by cultural and religious issues that citizens would like to be taken into consideration when further enlargements are on the table.

 Source: Eurobarometer Flash N°257⁶

Should the identity criterion not be “revolutionized”, and the term culture defined legally and politically by the EU, the term “common” and “multiple” will continue to be perceived as antithetical.

The fact that culture and identity have sustained nearly the same evolution is particularly interesting. They were perceived and understood first as substantialist and monolithic concepts and have come to be understood as being interactive and pluralist notions.

The identity issue is present at every stage of society: at the personal stage but also at the community level. To understand its complex interaction, we will refer to the work of Micheline Rey⁷ in order to distinguish three points of view:

1. First point of view: the one of an individual. Identity represents then coherence of his action modes.
2. Second, the social actor point of view: cultural identity has become a kind of legitimating or claiming strategy most often seen in cases of conflict when economic or political agendas as imbued with the noble ‘cultural identity’ rendering the resolution of such conflicts particularly complex.
3. Third, in the researcher’s mind, cultural identity would be a kind of heuristic hypothesis, a conceptual tool that we can use as a regulating principle to grasp our reflection about the world.

In the work of Durkheim, Parsons, Bakhtin and Bourdieu, culture comes to occupy a privileged position, its structure and forms linked to specific social and historical contexts yet partly autonomous of social structure, institutions and social interaction. But Durkhiem, Parsons, and the Frankfurt school also theorize culture partly in terms of its role in securing social integration, while simultaneous arguing that culture always involves immanent, transcendent universal values. Then, according to Swingewood, the modern concept of culture arose simultaneously with “the idea of modernity and the development of industrial capitalism, laid the basis for the autonomisation of culture into distinctive spheres or fields, institutions and practices each structured in terms of specific internal logic and properties”⁸.

Indeed, identity became a major issue in Europe, at the Center of the debate in 2005 with the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty and the fear of the “Polish Plumber”, largely exploited by the “NO” partisans. In 2009, identity surrounded one more time in the political debate with a public vote regarding minarets in Switzerland. And then, President Sarkozy had sought to use a national identity debate in France to heal social rifts: Should France implement ‘integration contracts’ which would set minimal levels of language and cultural knowledge for citizenship? And should students be required to sing the national anthem ‘La Marseillaise’ at least once a year? Some fear that these types of questions –even the debates themselves– invite assumptions that generations of immigrants have already undermined France’s identity and may provoke nationalist sentiments long championed by Le Pen. “When you put immigration and national identity side by side, it creates the notion that immigration poses a threat to national identity –which can inspire racism”, Mouloud Aounit, president of the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples, told the daily l’Humanité on Nov. 2. “But this debate also reveals an identity crisis of a part of French society (…) and the failure of its model of integration, which doesn’t allow people to do just that”⁹. And paradoxically, the extreme right French leader’s finding was quite similar: “This country is suffering a major crisis of identity that is driving it into chaos,” Marine Le Pen said¹⁰.

“What is French and Frenchness?” Instead of this fruitless question, it would have been much more useful and clever to launch a debate on “What is European or Europeanness?”. This three months debate, confining citizens to a reductive and discriminatory perspective, moved them away from any European consciousness, and made religion, roots, education and “cultural belonging” the heart of immigration matter, in a negative way. France is home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority and Islam now ranks as the nation’s second religion, so opinion was rattled by the Swiss referendum vote to ban minaret construction. The EU needs to integrate its immigrant and to live with its new face(s), serenely. The identity concept, and mainly for a State, less refers to the idea of “being” than to the idea of “becoming”.

Europe, and all the more European culture, inheres in diversity. Nothing could harm it more than the notion of unity, which carries with it a risk of homogeny. « Kaleidoscopic culture », the European culture is nourished by the diversity of national and regional cultures, languages and identities including those of the minorities. Faced with a constantly growing European Union, it would seem right, if not necessary, to establish as soon as possible a common policy of decision and action in regard to culture. However, such a decision would contradict the Treaties in their current state.

Culture and Foreign affairs

Since 1975, the European community has developed various relations with third countries through accords of association, cooperation, or partnership¹¹ whose content has evolved while political dialogue has been added to the economic dimension conditioning it at times. Cultural rights have appeared there, imposing culture as a factor, if not always officially recognized as being essential than at least determining external cooperation¹². As an example, “the culture lens is an approach promoted by UNFPA that can advance the goals of programming effectively and efficiently with strong community acceptance and ownership. It is an analytical and programming tool that helps policy makers and development practitioners to analyze values, assets and structures in their planning and programming processes (…) especially in the areas of women’s empowerment and promotion of reproductive health and rights, understand and utilize positive cultural”¹³.

Nevertheless, following analysis of some partnerships with a strong cultural component, such as the agreements with the ACP or Mediterranean countries, a conclusion will be reached that culture, despite being an important factor of integration and immigration policies, is rejected.

But, paradoxically, at the same time, the cultural dimension of the common economic policy became a major international issue. In this context, culture has been transformed from being a purely economic issue to becoming Europe’s proverbial ‘battle horse’, to the point of having brought about the modification of Treaties and of bringing the Community to boast of its “indirect cultural competences”. Audiovisual material can be examined as a perfect example to analyze the continuous battle that has opposed the EU and the USA for decades, first within the GATT and currently in the framework of WTO, focusing on the potential consequences of this new cultural challenge, starting from those which concern the very identity of Europe. Has the defense of this “European cultural identity” not become a banner that is brandished in order to conceal purely economic and political interests that are the real motivation behind EU’s front?¹⁴

Along the same lines, in the field of European integration, culture, deprived of a real recognition, is of utmost importance. The latest enlargements of the EU in 2004 – also the largest one – and in 2007, led us to conclude that most of the obstacles that oppose EU enlargement to include certain countries derive from an identity-orientated interpretation of culture.

From a political point of view, the EU’s greatest problemthen was the difficulty of defining which countries on the  eastern borders were “European” and therefore eligible to join the EU (presuming that they meet the political and economic criteria for membership)¹⁵. But another problem was also the huge opposition and fear among the public opinion, persisting even after the enlargement.

Then, when the European Commission asked about the negative consequences of the integration of central and Eastern European countries (CEE) in the EU, 54% of the EU respondents consider that enlargement has caused “problems because of the divergent cultural traditions” of the new Member States.

Source: Eurobarometer Flash N°257

“In only three EU countries did a clear majority disagree that the expansions brought up issues related to an increased cultural diversity across Member States. In most countries, a usually slim majority agreed that the inclusion of the CEE countries in the European Union created problems because of the existence of “too different cultures and values among the different countries of the European Union” ¹⁶. This opinion was more frequently confirmed in the EU15 region with 57%, and more especially in Germany (65%), Austria (64%), Greece (63%), Italy (62%) and Portugal and Cyprus (both 61%).

Reluctances and disagreements that arise from the moment one ‘touches culture’ are based on a set of factors, often rooted in incomprehension, ignorance or simply semantic confusion. In this regard the endless debate about Turkey and the non-ratification of the Constitution provide two different very interesting parallels. All of those examples demonstrate the need to establish an identifiable European culture that could be used as a reference in the eventual case of future European integration.

Source: Eurobarometer Flash N°257

On the international arena, the same finding of failure could be established. The case of Kosovo, that has become a major issue in Europe for a while, could be taken as another example, in order to demonstrate to what extent the search for a political solution is often contradictory to a cultural and ethnic heritage. “Inevitably this leads to a new analysis of the role of culture in the generation of conflicts, as well as in their resolution. Most of the current conflicts have very strong cultural motivations, as they have terrible cultural side-effects. Understanding this, beyond the usual clichés about Culture and the Artists, is one of the best ways to combat the so-called “inevitable” war between civilizations”¹⁷. As examples, Ferdinand Richard also reminds us the responsibility of popular musicians launching songs of war and hate on the waves of Radio des Mille Collines in Rwanda, or through turbo-folk songs in former Yugoslavia. He also incites us to read the “European cultural activists Ritva Mitchell and Simon Mundy’s reports on Vukovar in 1997 for the Council of Europe. In Vukovar, at a time when guns were still hot, they were sent in UN helicopters in the middle of the city as the first attempt to re-start dialogue between opposed communities, directly on the cease-fire line. Somewhere in the system, someone finally came to the clever conclusion that only cultural activists could re-initiate the knitting of the threads of peace”¹⁸.

Ten years later, the identity problem brought to our attention by the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 illustrates how despite of Europe’s excessive references to culture, the international community’s discussion of culture, its role and cultural exchanges, is at its initial stage, while it could contribute to a better EU’s international recognition.

Unable to speak with one voice in such important issues as Iraq war, eighteen years ago, or as Libya, a few weeks ago, soft power was and seems to be still the only way for the EU to get international recognition as a global actor. It remains, with trade, the major (if not unique) aspect of its new Common Foreign Policy.

Becoming “the biggest provider of development aid in the world”, the Union increased that way its credibility and strengthened its position. In 2004, some authors like Mark Leonard¹⁹, T.R. Reid²⁰ and Jeremy Rifkin²¹ even published books contending that, despite limited military resources, Europe will leverage its “soft power” into influence on par with the US. But as Terence Casey demonstrated, “translating soft power into actualized power is difficult and, paradoxically, may require more hard power than Europe possesses”. In short, “much of European soft power derives from its (hard) economic power”²². Yet, the financial crisis has demonstrated the limits of this frame and stressed on the necessity for the EU to renew the concept and the results. The EU has to move beyond the limits of its current policies.

Providing a favorable ground for many major topics such as the European security and defense policy (ESDP) and the first step toward the emergence of a European citizenship, “a new European smart power” could be part of the answer.

Culture as part of Smart power

The concept of “Smart power”, created by Suzanne Nossel in her article published in the Foreign Affairs Review in 2004, is the combination of hard and soft power²³. “With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of Foreign policy. This is not a radical idea: the ancient Roman poet Terence, who was born a slave and rose to become one of the great voices of his time, declared that ‘in every endeavor, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first.’ The same truth binds wise women as well”²⁴.

But a more radical fact, and to an extent which is less known, is that culture, indeed, contributes to security and defense policies²⁵. “The need for reconsidering culture’s impact on warfare should not have come as a surprise. Culture’s relationship to armed conflict has been an important focus in war studies in the post-Cold War period. The Culture of Military Innovation, by Dima Adamsky, and Beer, Bacon, and Bullets, by Gal Luft, both claim that culture plays a critical role in influencing the conduct of war. “Adamsky explores strategic culture and its effect on military organizations, and Luft examines how culture impacts militaries operating together in coalition warfare. They both compellingly argue that policymakers and military leaders must either understand culture’s impact on military matters or face the regrettable consequences of their ignorance”²⁶. If we consider smart power as the moderate and well-balanced use of hard and soft, in a case like Iraq or Afghanistan, perfect examples of hard power requirement, the addition of soft power in general (and cultural diplomacy in particular) should be very useful to contain the conflict²⁷.

It could be also helpful on the field as an additional tool to understand opponents’ way of thinking: “in the Iraq conflict only the Dutch contingent had a cultural policy advisor and it almost certainly saved man lives”²⁸.

The new US Foreign Policy and the new “Smart Power” approach decided in 2009 by President Obama and Mrs. Clinton²⁹, since has been increasing the cultural influence. As Joseph Nye Jr. recognized, “the resources that produce soft power for a country include its culture (where it is attractive to others); its values (where they are attractive and not undercut by inconsistent practices); and policies (where they are seen as inclusive and legitimate in the eyes of others)”³⁰. As he develops on his last book, The Future of Power, if it can’t face all problems, soft power can amplify or undercut hard power depending upon circumstances and use. But moreover, we argue it could help, and especially cultural matters, to counterbalance the negative impact of conflicts (hard power) on public opinion.

In the particular case of the EU, a new smart power concept could generate – or at least contribute to – a feeling of European citizenship. “Citizenship, a concept that articulates concerns both relevant to arts practice and to the role of civil society as an inclusive, participatory actor in European public space, has therefore been a central issue [for the EU] for many years.(…) And yet the concept of European citizenship is one of the most difficult contemporary political ideas to define and to work with”³¹. In our opinion, it should evolve as a function of the dynamics of the construction of a united Union. Marc Morjé Howard argues in The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, that despite remarkable convergence in their economic, judicial, and social policies, the countries of the European Union still maintain very different definitions of citizenship. Based on the measure of national citizenship policies, it accounts for both historical variation and contemporary change. Howard’s historical explanation highlights the legacies of colonialism and early democratization, which unintentionally created relatively inclusive citizenship regimes, showing in particular how anti-immigrant public opinion –when activated politically, usually by far right movements or public referenda– can block the liberalizing tendencies of political elites³².

How might European citizenship make manifest a new model of citizenship, one that goes beyond the traditional relationship between citizen and State? In our opinion, above and beyond the minimalist conception of culture and citizenship laid out in the European Treaties, the concept of European citizenship challenges our traditional models, and requires taking on board new definitions that recognize the impact of the social, cultural and political changes.

To ignore the political impact of cultural aspects is to create a blind strategy that cannot be adapted to the construction of Europe. The current policy concentrated in the hands of Member States, sees culture from the perspective of the Nation-State. The European plurality, however, cannot be reduced to such confines. Despite the different rhetoric and diverse understandings of Federalism, (or even of European culture), this model of policy seems to be most suitable to unify European diversity and unity under one common umbrella. Even if these conditions for the emergence of a European civil society seem very idealistic and distant, they should guide the practical politics of today. EU has to undertake European identity and European culture (and first to define them) to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in its political construction.

Conclusion

To conclude, the main characteristic of the EU’s cultural policy seems to be its very inexistence. This appears particularly paradoxical given that culture has become an integral component of other EU policies to the point of becoming crucial in various sectors, some as surprising as the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Its ‘dilution’ in other policies, although prudent, proves its usefulness in fields such as immigration and European integration, sustainable development on local and national scales, cooperation and valorization, to name just a few. Following Jürgen Habermas33, who judged that principles of democracy should be reformulated in the light of changes that have taken place in society, the same diagnosis should be applied to culture. The relations between an individual, the social and the political level are shifting constantly. The tendency that is slowly taking us towards the creation of a political, rather than purely economic European Union further highlights its importance. Policies, that are not linked to the social sphere, that underpins them as well as it nourishes culture, are deprived of sense and finality.

The European culture, if it should be possible to define it and recognize it one day, should be framed by policies in its image, revealing its essence that is « kaleidoscopic culture ». All attempts at a common cultural policy, in as much as it is possible, must be aware of this specificity. The future, let us hope, will confirm this, unless the questions and fears that make and unmake Europe, writing its history despite of themselves, shall decide differently.

Notes

¹ Aude Jehan, La culture au sein de l’UE: objet politique non identifié, coll. Euryopa, Institut européen de l’Université de Genève, 2008.

² The Treaty on European Union, which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993.

³ Culture Action Europe Newsletter # 8 – Making culture matter -December 2009.

⁴ Katérina Sténou, UNESCO and the issue of cultural diversity, Review and strategy, 1946-2003, UNESCO, Paris, 2000, p. 3.

⁵ Ibid p. 4.

⁶ Eurobarometer EB Flash 257, February 2009. p36: Answers to the question Q4 about further enlargements Q4. In case the European Union would consider accepting new member countries in the future, according to you, what should be the two issues from the following list to be taken into account by Europe as a whole/by [OUR COUNTRY]/for you personally when making a decision? a) Freedom and democratic values b) Ageing of European population c) European Union’s role in the world d) Economic issues e) Stability at European Union’s borders f) Cultural and religious issues g) Immigration issues.

⁷ Micheline Rey, Identités culturelles et interculturalité en Europe, L’Europe en bref, CEC, Actes sud, Paris, 1997.

⁸ Alan Swingewood, Cutural Theory and the Problem of Modernity, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998.

⁹ Bruce Crumley, Berets and Baguettes? France Rethinks Its Identity, Time Magazine, November 04, 2009 and Why France’s National Identity Debate Backfired, Time Magazine, February 12, 2010.

¹⁰ Interview from Marine Le Pen, Europe 1 radio station, on October 28, 2009 and quoted by Time Magazine.

28, 2009 and quoted by Time Magazine.

¹¹ Mainly with the Mediterranean and African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries through Conventions of Lomé: I, II, III, IV (1975-1989).

¹² The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in January 1976. It recognizes officially, among others, the right to education, and the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.

¹³ The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), www.unfpa.org/sustainable/rights.htm

¹⁴ See Aude Jehan, La culture au sein de l’UE: objet politique non identifié, coll. Euryopa, Institut européen de l’Université de Genève, IEUG, 2008.

¹⁵ Cf. Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3rd Edition, Boulder, USA, 2005.

¹⁶ Eurobarometer : EB Flash 257, “Views on European Union Enlargement”, February 2009, p. 6.

17 Ferdinand Richard’s speech, «The role of Culture in Defense and Security Policy: Soft power and political ecology”, European Green Party, Budapest, April 2nd, 2011.

¹⁸ Idem.

¹⁹ Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century, Fourth estate, London, 2005.

²⁰ T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The new Superpower and the End of American Supremacy, Penguin, New York, 2004.

²¹ Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s vision of the future is quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Tarcher/Penguin, New York, 2004.

²² Terence Casey, Europe, Soft Power, and ‘Genteel Stagnation’, Comparative European Politics Review, 2006, Volume IV, Number 4, p. 404.

²³ A term coined by Joseph Nye Jr. In 1990 and reinvigorated as a critique of the Bush Administration’s unilateralism (in 2002). In contrast to hard power (tangible assets), soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others; convincing other actors to want the same things as you. Such desire is instilled by a nation’s culture (attractive), political values (favorable and consistent at home and abroad), and foreign policy (legitimate and having moral authority) cf. Terence Casey’s definition in Europe, Soft Power, and ‘Genteel Stagnation’, Comparative European Politics Review, 2006, IV, p. 402.

²⁴ Idem.

²⁵ Its primordial role in the post-conflict reconstruction, notably in the Balkans, brought upon it a certain interest that has become a cultural dimension within the EU’s security and defense policy (ESDP).

²⁶ Peter R. Mansoor, “The softer Side of War”, Foreign Affairs January/February 2011

²⁷ “As we focus on Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, we must also actively pursue a strategy of smart power in the Middle East that addresses the security needs of Israel and the legitimate political and economic aspirations of the Palestinians; that effectively challenges Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and sponsorship of terror, and persuades both Iran and Syria to abandon their dangerous behavior and become constructive regional actors; that strengthens our relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, other Arab states, with Turkey, and with our partners in the Gulf to involve them in securing a lasting peace in the region”. Hillary Clinton, op. cit.

²⁸ Ferdinand Richard, op. cit.

²⁹ In her confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, (January 13, 2009) Hillary Clinton said: «The President-Elect and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage of principles and pragmatism, not rigid ideology. We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of tools at our disposal.” http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Get smart”, International Herald Tribune, 16 January 2009.

³¹ Culture Action Europe Newsletter # 8 – Making culture matter -December,2009.

³² Marc Morjé Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. Cambridge University Press. 2009.

³³ Jürgen Habermas, Droit et démocratie : entre faits et normes, trad. de l’allemand par Rainer Rochlitz et Christian Bouchindhomme, Paris, Gallimard, « NRF essais », 1997. (Trad. de : Faktizität und Geltung : Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats).

References

• ADAMSKY, Dima (2009). The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Stanford University Press.
• CASEY, Terence (2006). “Europe, Soft Power, and Genteel Stagnation”, Comparative European Politics Review, Volume IV, Number 4.
• CLINTON, Hillary (2009). Confirmation hearings discourse of January 13, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf
• CRUMLEY, Bruce (2009). “Berets and Baguettes? France Rethinks Its Identity”, Time Magazine, November 04.
• CRUMLEY, Bruce (2010). “Why France’s National Identity Debate Backfired”, Time Magazine, February 12.
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